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Decision Chains and Organizational 
Factors 
 
Many people are involved in flight planning/execution 
Administrators 
Mission planners 
Maintainers 
Flight crew 
Coordinated efforts of personnel are required  
Standards and procedures 
Supervisory policies 
Communications paths 
A weak link in the chain can lead to disaster 
 
Case Study 1 
XB-70/F-104 Mid-air Collision 
8 June 1966 
F-104 drifted into contact with XB-70 wingtip, 
possibly due to inadvertent stick input 
Casualties: Two experienced test pilots dead, one injured 
 
Materiel loss: F-104 ($1,133,053), XB-70 ($219,500,000) 
  
What went wrong? 
Planning 
 
Photo session approved by AF XB-70 Test Force Director despite initial objections from NAA  
 
Test Force director did not seek approval from higher headquarters 
 
XB-70 program director did not voice any objection to plans for the formation flight 
 
 
Execution 
 
Weather conditions led to change in altitude, route, and direction of flight from those briefed 
 
Photo plane not equipped with UHF (communications had to be relayed through a ground 
station) 
 
Extended time in formation; planned 30 minutes extended to 45 minutes (pilot workload) 
 
F-104 pilot did not have good visual references to judge distance from XB-70 
 
Distraction due to other air traffic (B-58 in supersonic corridor) 
 
 
Afterward, the Air Force made numerous administrative changes to improve operational 
procedures, starting with correction of supervisory and procedural weaknesses within the 
responsible test organization. 
Reason’s “Swiss Cheese Model” 
 
Post-accident analysis revealed a classic example of Prof. James Reason’s model of 
safety vulnerabilities in highly technical and complex organizations in which areas of 
vulnerability are “holes” in the layers of defense guarding against error.  
Case Study 2 
B-1A low-altitude stall/spin 
29 August 1984 
“Warning Fatigue” 
Warning lights on the Master Caution panel occasionally illuminated throughout the flight. 
Because the situations most often were not serious, the pilot simply reset the Master Caution 
each time. 
 
The crew gradually became anesthetized to the alarms, ignoring vital information. 
Dynamic minimum control-speed test conducted at 300 knots CAS, below 10,000 feet MSL, 
with wings swept forward, flaps extended and gear down. Actual altitude was 4,000 feet 
AGL. 
 
Pilot swept wings in one continuous motion despite being advised to do so in stages. C.G. 
change. 
 
Control Room personnel turned away from their strip charts and began discussing the 
quality of the data received during the previous test points. Nobody was monitoring the 
data. 
Casualties: One experienced test pilot killed, two injured 
 
Materiel loss: B-1 ($325,000,000) 
What went wrong? 
Mission planning 
 
Change in personnel; relatively inexperienced mission planner replaced “Jedi Master” 
 
Test points at full-aft/clean and full-forward/dirty configurations were scheduled without an 
intermediate test point. 
 
Crew resource management 
 
Mixed experience. Pilot-in-Command had less than 14 hours in the B-1. Co-pilot was described 
as “probably the most experienced and knowledgeable B-1 pilot in the world.” Deference led 
to “silent incapacitation.” 
 
Crew failed to manually transfer fuel during wing-sweep, resulting in out-of-trim condition 
 
Crew anesthetized to alarms on Master Caution panel; ignored an important warning 
 
Mission control 
 
No indicators to highlight unsafe aircraft parameters 
 
No coordination between Control Room personnel and aircrew regarding A/C center of 
gravity 
 
Control Room personnel not monitoring flight during critical phase 
 
Need for cockpit discipline, adherence to protocol, and attention to 
detail. 
Case Study 3 
X-31 loss of control 
19 January 1995 
Kiel probe is susceptible to icing (Venturi effect) 
 
Not equipped with heating system 
 
Casualties: One experienced test pilot injured 
 
Materiel loss: X-31 (Approximately $80,000,000) 
Reversionary Flight Control Modes 
At any time prior to loss of control, the pilot could have activated the R3 mode  
What went wrong? 
Automation bias 
 
Catastrophic consequences of pitot-static system failure discovered in simulation but failed to lead to 
corrective action 
 
Reliance on Flight Control System warning annuciators 
 
Lack of configuration awareness 
 
Change from Rosemount probe (heated) to Kiel probe (unheated) 
 
Kiel probe susceptibility to icing was not known to all project personnel 
 
Pitot heat switch not placarded as inoperative 
 
Poor communications 
 
System safety analyses failed to identify potential catastrophic consequences of failure in pitot-static system 
 
Configuration control process failed to disseminate condition of pitot heating system 
 
Majority of test team was unaware of inoperative condition of switch 
 
Crew resource management 
 
Complacency in control room 
 
Pilot’s lack of situation awareness 
 
Lack of information sharing 
 
Need for improved configuration awareness, communications, and CRM 
Why is this important? 
 
Case studies provide valuable lessons for understanding the 
interaction of people with aircraft systems and with each other 
during flight operations. 
 
Organizations should archive and review case studies of disasters 
and near misses in order to avoid repeating errors. 
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Resources 
For additional information, see Breaking The Mishap Chain, a 
collection of case studies highlighting human factors in aerospace 
accidents and incidents. 
Design factors 
Physiological factors 
Organizational factors 
Hard copies available from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office bookstore: 
http://bookstore.gpo.gov/ 
 
E-book available for free download: 
http://www.nasa.gov/connect/ebooks/bre
ak_mishap_chain_detail.html. 
Questions? 
